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The dynamics of ethical product differentiation and the habit 






In our model of ethical product differentiation two duopolists (a 
zero profit socially concerned producer and a profit maximizing 
producer) compete over prices and (costly) “socially and 
environmentally responsible” features of their products under a 
given law of motion of consumer’ habits. 
In a continuous time model  in which the location of the zero 
profit social responsible entrant is fixed and the profit 
maximizing producer (PMP) limits himself to price competition 
without ethical imitation, we show that the optimal dynamic PMP’s 
price is always lower than his optimal static price since the PMP 
producer knows that, by leaving too much market share to the other 
producer, he will reinforce the habit of socially responsible 
consumption and loose further market share in the future. We 
inspect the properties of equilibria when the PMP can ethically 
imitate the entrant and when the entrant is free to choose his 
location. We find that, in the first case, the threshold 
triggering a PMP strategy of ethical imitation and minimum price 
differentiation is lower in the dynamic than in the static case, 
depending on the PMP’s shadow cost of changes in consumers social 
responsibility. 
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In the traditional literature of horizontal differentiation 
localisation is usually referred to as physical location or, more 
generally, as the space of product characteristics (Hotelling, 
1929; D’Aspremont-Gabszewich and Thisse, 1979; Dasgupta-Maskin, 
1986; Economides, 1986). One of these characteristics, which is 
becoming increasingly relevant today, is social and environmental 
responsibility.  
The reduction of distances induced by technological progress has 
increased the importance of global public goods and the 
sensitiveness of the public opinion toward the preservation of the 
environment  and the fight to poverty in less developed countries. 
This increased awareness has generated a series of “grassroot” 
welfare initiatives which focus on socially responsible (or 
socially concerned) saving and consumption.  
One of them is promoted by zero profit importers, distributors and 
retailers (called fair traders)
2 of food and textile products which 
                                                 
2  The definition of fair trade considered in this paper is quite different from the 
traditional meaning of “Fair trade” in the field of industrial organization. From the 
1930s onward (although there are antecedents going back to 1900), in both the US and 
the UK, the term refers to schemes of industry trade association to regulate 
competition among members, usually by requiring that prices be posted in advance 
and that no transactions take place except at posted prices.  During the Great 
Depression in the U.S., such schemes were part of the National Recovery Act. In the 
more recent literature fair trade indicates "arguments that relate to 
certain conditions under which trade, and the production of traded 
goods, should minimally take place” (Maseland and Vaal, 2002). In 
this framework fair trade generally refers to the absence of 
duties, controls and dumping practices in international trade (for 
a similar use of the term, for example, see also Mendoza and   4
have been partially or wholly manufactured by poor rural 
communities in developing countries. To be labeled as such, fair 
trade products need to respect a series of social and 
environmental criteria.  
Fair trade is just a small part of the market for socially 
responsible consumption (and savings) which is considerably 
growing. Fair trade products are beginning to achieve non 
negligible market shares. They captured around 2.5% of the tea 
market in Germany, 2.7% of the coffee market in the Netherlands 
and about 15% of the banana market in Switzerland in the year 
2000. The existence of positive market shares for these products, 
whose price is often higher than that of traditional products, is 
a revealed preference argument for the relevance of socially 
concerned consumption and for the existence of ethical or fairness 
arguments in consumers’ utility function.
3  
                                                                                                                                                                  
Bahadur, 2002; Bhagwati, 1996; Stiglitz, 2002; Suranovic, 2002).The 
fair trade products we refer to in this paper are on the contrary, food and artisan 
products which obtain the fair trade label when their production process follow some 
criteria for social and environmental sustainability established by the movement of 
fair trade importers and retailers. 
3 There is a growing interest for socially responsible savings and 
consumption also in the institutions. In 1999 the United Nations 
launched the Global Compact, a coalition of large businesses, 
trade unions and environmental and human rights groups, brought 
together to share a dialogue on corporate social responsibility. 
In the same year the European Commission issued a document on Fair 
Trade (29.11.1999 COM(1999) 619. In its introduction it is stated 
that  "Fair trade" is an example of development occurring through 
trading relationships and improved commercial opportunities to 
bridge the gap between developed and developing countries and to 
facilitate the better integration of developing countries in the 
world economy. "Fair trade" initiatives give consumers the 
opportunity to contribute towards sustainable economic and social 
development in developing countries through their purchasing 
preferences. More recently, in July 2001, the Commission issued a 
Green Book COM(2001) 366 to promote firm social responsibility in   5
The diffusion of forms of socially responsible consumption 
such as fair trade is accompanied by a wide range of imitation 
strategies enacted by traditional producers. Many companies are 
starting advertising not only price and quality, but also their 
socially responsible actions.
4 Social labeling and corporate 
responsibility is gradually becoming an important competitive 
feature in real and financial markets.
5    
The aim of this paper is to provide a theoretical background 
for this emerging kind of competition. We do so by adopting a 
horizontal differentiation approach and  by reinterpreting the 
well known Hotelling line segment in terms of ethical or “social 
responsibility” space. 
The paper is divided into six sections (including introduction and 
conclusions). In the second section we present the basic features 
of the horizontal differentiation model. In the third section we 
                                                                                                                                                                  
the European framework. Large part of the Green Book deals with 
fair trade.  
4 Corporate perception by consumers (90 percent of respondents) is 
by far the most selected item (against ethical values of managers, 
tax incentives and relationship with stakeholders) when a sample 
of interviewed socially responsible companies is asked about 
reasons for their socially responsible behaviour in the “2003 
Corporate social responsibility monitor” (downloadable at 
http://www.bsdglobal.com/issues/sr.asp). This finding is consistent with 
our hypothesis that ethical imitation is today a relevant 
competitive feature in product markets. 
5 In a recent survey the “2003 Corporate social responsibility 
monitor” finds that the amount of consumers looking at social 
responsibility in their choices jumped from 36 percent in 1999 to 
62 percent in 2001 in Europe. In addition, more than one in five 
consumers reported having either rewarded or punished companies, 
based on their perceived social performance and more than a 
quarter of share-owning Americans took into account ethical 
considerations when buying and selling stocks. The Social 
Investment Forum reports that in the US in 1999, there was more   6
analyse the dynamic model in which a profit maximizing producer 
(henceforth PMP) competes in prices (but not in ethical location) 
with an “ethically”
6 concerned producer (henceforth fair trader or 
FT). In the fourth section we remove the assumption of PMP’s fixed 
ethical location. In the fifth section we remove the assumption of 
FT’s fixed ethical location so that the two producers jointly 






2. The ethical differentiation model: basic assumptions 
 
Most of the hypotheses in the model which follows are standard 
assumptions in the horizontal differentiation literature. Some 
others are original and are given by the specific nature of 
ethical competition. 
A “traditional” monopolist sells a good to consumers with 
inelastic, unit demands. Consumers are uniformly distributed 
across the line segment [0,1] according to their concerns for 
social responsibility. The monopolist activity consists of 
transforming raw materials received from unskilled producers in 
                                                                                                                                                                  
than $2 trillion worth of assets invested in portfolios that used 
screens linked to the environment and social responsibility.  
6 In all the paper we will call this player the ethical player for 
simplicity and convenience. This does not imply any value 
judgement on the lack of ethics of the other competitor.    7
the South, paid with a monopsony wage (w).
7 The final product is 
sold to consumers in the North. The monopolist maximizes profits 
by fixing a price PA for his product. In this first version of the 
model we assume, for simplicity, and without lack of generality, 
that the incumbent has no social responsibility and is located at 
one extreme of the ethical segment (position a=0).  
Consider now in a fixed location case the effects on the incumbent 
strategy of the entry of a socially concerned producer which 
generically takes a different position on the ethical segment and 
fixes a price PB for his product. This producer, exactly as the 
fair traders described in the introduction (this is the reason why 
we call him also FT), is zero profit and his goal is to maximise 
transfers to raw material producers in the South to raise their 
wage from monopsony to competitive levels
8 and to transfer 
resources which can be invested in local public goods to improve 
future market opportunities for these producers.
9 The socially 
                                                 
7 The reality is more complex since under an alternative but 
equally valid approach fair traders usually break excess 
bargaining powers of local buyers or transportation intermediaries 
which force local producers to sell primary or intermediate 
products at prices below values they would earn in a competitive 
market with equal bargaining power between sellers and buyers. We 
believe that our simple approach catches the main point of the 
issue.  
8 We take the fair trader as an example of socially responsible 
producer and identify social responsibility in the resources 
transferred to producers in the South. Our model may be 
generalised and applied also to environmentally concerned 
producers by assuming that there are no “free lunches” in social 
responsibility and that the adoption of environmentally 
responsible production processes increases costs exactly as in our 
fair trader's example. 
9 The diffusion of producers which create private and social value 
without being profit maximisers is confirmed by the fact that fair 
trade producers exist and are growing. In the year 2000 there were   8
responsible features of the entrant consist of selling his product 
at zero profit and transferring a “free margin” s to finance 
investment in public goods and education in the South (exactly as 
the "fair trader" does). The zero profit condition of the entrant 
is: PB =w(1+s). 
We assume that social responsibility depends on the amount s 
transferred to the South. Therefore the amount of this transfer 
determines the position on the segment.
10 In this first example, 
for simplicity, fair trader location is exogenously set at b=1, 
the other extreme of the ethical segment.  
After FT's entry consumers may choose between two products which 
differ in prices and socially responsible features. 
The difference with respect to the traditional horizontal 
differentiation models is that opposite locations in the consumers 
interval do not imply differences in physical distance, but in the 
psychological perception of the ethical value of the good.
11 The 
                                                                                                                                                                  
97 fair trade importers from 18 countries and 2740 no profit 
retailers of fair trade products  only in Europe according to the 
Fair Trade Association. In 2000, in the U.S. and Canada, 600 
outlets wholesaled Fair Trade products, while at least 2575 
offered retail. In 2001, at least 7000 provided retail. 
10 Consider again that, since environmental responsibility is one 
of the main features of fair trade products, the reasoning of our 
model also applies in case we replace the socially responsible 
(transfer to the South) with the environmentally responsible 
(adoption of a more environmental product) feature of the ethical 
entrant. In this case we should assume a trade-off between 
environmental sustainability and production costs assuming that 
the producer chooses a technique with an added marginal cost s for 
any unit sold, generated by the adoption of environmentally 
sustainable practices. 
11 In this model we abstract from considerations of asymmetric 
information and divergences between consumers' and sellers' 
perception of the ethical value of the good by assuming that they 
coincide. To reduce distance from reality it may be interesting in   9
consideration of ethical instead of physical distance makes an 
important difference. Consistently with our concept of ethical 
distance, we assume that the cost of moving along the line segment 
is positive only for those going from a more ethical to a less 
ethical point (Figure 1). As a consequence, by considering the 
extreme right of the segment as the most ethical position, 
consumers move without costs to the right, while they incur in 
costs proportional to the “ethical” distance anytime they move to 
the left.
12 
We assume that consumers utilities are decreasing in product price 
and also in the distance between consumer's ethical stance and the 
ethical value incorporated in the purchased product. The 
psychological cost of buying a product which is below one's own 
ethical standards is “f” times the ethical distance so that 




                                                                                                                                                                  
an extension of this model, to analyse market equilibria under 
asymmetric information and to consider the role of ethical 
trademarks. 
12 The rationale for these assumptions is that moving to the left 
implies choosing a product below one’s own ethical standards 
(which is psychologically costly), while moving to the right 
implies choosing a product above one’s own ethical standards (and 
therefore we assume that it does not give any psychological cost 
to the buyer). 
13 The way we design consumers preferences is consistent with 
empirical evidence and consumers surveys in which values are shown 
to be a determinant of choices together with prices (see footnote 
6 on 2003 Corporate social responsibility monitor). From a 
theoretical point of view this point has been remarkably analysed, 
among others, by Sen (1993) showing that people choose also on the 
basis of their values and, for this reason, they do not always 
choose what they would strictly prefer on the basis of prices.    10
Uc=Rp-Pi, if x-a<0 
 where (Pi) is the price of product sold by the i-th seller, (Rp) 
is the common consumers’ reservation price and x denotes generic 
consumer location on the ethical segment.
14 
After the FT’s entry the consumer’s indifference condition is 
equal to PA+f(x-a)=PB, if x-a≥0, and PA=PB, if x-a<0. It is 
therefore clear that the condition for a nonzero market share for 
the FT is that, for some values of x, f(x-a)>PB-PA. Since in this 
first simple case we set a=0, we obtain the following share for 
the  incumbent:  x*=(PB – PA)/f.  
 
3. An ethical differential model with simultaneous moves and open-
loop strategies. 
 
We now analyse what happens if our two agents choose their 
strategies taking into account that consumers’ ethical preferences 
may change over time as a function of their location strategies. 
To do so we consider a dynamic model where each player maximizes 
his objective function (the present value of his profit function 
in the PMP case and of transfers to the South in the FT case) over 
                                                 
14 With the specification of the FT’s behaviour and of consumer’s 
position on the segment the cost of ethical distance  has a clear 
monetary counterpart. When the producer is located at the right of 
the consumer this cost represents the distance in monetary terms 
between the transfer which is considered fair by the consumer 
(indicated by his location on the segment), and the transfer 
provided by the producer (indicated by producer’s location on the 
segment). The coefficient f maps this objective measure into 
subjective consumers’ preferences indicating whether its impact on 
consumers utility is proportional (f=1), more than proportional   11
an infinite time horizon, by designing a strategy for those 
variables which are under his control.                               
Control variables are, respectively, location and price for the 
PMP and location only for the FT. Choices of the two players 
influence their objective functions as well as the state of the 
consumers ethical preferences through a differential equation (the 
“law of motion of consumers’ habit for social responsibility).  
 
3.1.1 The dynamic model when FT location is exogenous and PMP’s 
ethical location is fixed 
 
 
In this first simplified version of the model locations of the two 
players are fixed. Therefore the PMP does not imitate the FT in 
social responsibility and competes only in prices.
15 The PMP 
maximizes in continuous time the following intertemporal profit 
function 
                                                                                                                                                                  
(f>1) or less than proportional (f<1) than its amount in monetary 
terms. 
15 It’s possible to show that, in absence of FT’s competition, the 
PMP has not incentive to choose a position different from zero. In 
fact, when he is alone on the market he is constrained on his 
price decision only by consumers’ reservation price. Therefore his 
market share will depend on this reservation price and on PMP 
price and ethical location. With Pb=Rp the joint maximization 
problem of the PMP is similar to the one analysed in this section 
with the exception of the law of motion of f which is affected 
only by the PMP imitation decision. When solving PMP dynamic 
maximization problem under this condition it is easy to check by 
inspection of first order conditions that PMP profit is strictly 
decreasing in a. Intuitively, he will not start ethical transfers 
to avoid the growth of consumers ethical concerns. Hence, the most 
profitable choice for PMP when he is alone on the market  is to 
locate in zero and the assumption of considering that PMP does no 
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A B 1 ' θ             (2) 
where changes in consumers social responsibility are affected, 
negatively, by depreciation from current levels of social 
responsibility (the parameter  θ measures consumers’ “loss of 
ethical memory”) and, positively, by the habit reinforcement 
generated by current consumption of socially responsible 
products.
16  
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A c 1 ] [ θ λ      (3) 
where  
t e
ρ µ λ = and µ is a costate variable  which may be interpreted 
as the marginal value (cost) of the variation in consumers’ social 
responsibility for the PMP. 
                                                                                                                                                                  
demonstration on this point is omitted and available from the 
authors upon request. 
16 We assume that habit reinforcement is determined by the share of 
socially responsible consumption and, consequently, by the market 
share of FT products. The rationale for this hypothesis may be 
that fair trade ads may be positively related to revenues. Fair 
trade retail shops give high attention to information on social 
responsibility (leaflets, documentation, etc.) and therefore past 
consumption may foster future consumption not only for a 
traditional habit formation process, but also for the effect of 
additional information and motivation gained when buying fair 
trade products.      13
Solutions for this problem include the derivative of the 
Hamiltonian with respect to the control variable PA  
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the law of motion of consumer’s social responsibility (our state 
variable) as a result of the derivative of the Hamiltonian with 











A B 1 ' θ           (5) 
and a differential equation for the costate variable including the 





























A B        (6). 
Equation (6) shows that the time variation of the shadow value 
(cost) of changes in consumers’ social responsibility for the PMP 
is equal to its current discounted value minus current sensitivity 
of his profits to changes in current consumers’ social 
responsibility.  
The last two conditions needed to define optimal solutions to the 
problem are the initial value of the costate variable and the non 
transversality condition 
17 
0 ) 0 ( f f =            (7) 




µ           (8) 
 
Solving (3) for PA we get the dynamic price reaction function of 
the PMP 
                                                 
17 It is trivial to observe that, as far as t goes to infinity the 
marginal cost of the variation of consumers social responsibility 













A         ( 9 )
18 
with  λ=0 we obtain the static version of the price reaction 
function. By inspecting it, we find that the incumbent price is 
obviously increasing in the fair trader transfer to the South. To 
understand the price strategy of the incumbent after the fair 
trader’s entry we observe that his optimal price is halfway 
between his zero profit price and the zero profit fair trader’s 
price. This means that the incumbent divides the distance between 
these two prices in two halves. One of them is his margin and the 
other is the extent of the price cut. 
Since λ is the PMP’s shadow value (cost) of a change in consumers’ 
ethical perception, equation (9) tells that, if λ is negative (as 
expected when the market share effect of a change in social 
responsibility dominates over other effects), a higher λ implies a 
higher penalty from changes in consumers’ ethical perception and 
therefore leads to a lower PMP optimal price in the dynamic than 
in the static case. The rationale is that, by doing this, the PMP 
may preserve larger market shares and therefore reduce formation 
of socially responsible consumer habits.   
                                                 
18 This open-loop solution is clearly subgame perfect since the 
optimal PMP price does not depend from the state variable f. Our 
first case therefore falls into the category of perfect or state 
redundant games (Mehlmann, 1988; Dockner, Long, Jorgensen and 
Sorger, 2000).   15
In demonstrating the proposition which follows we show that λ is 
negative and therefore that the optimal PMP price in the dynamic 
model is lower than in the static model 
 
Proposition: a positive PMP’s market share necessarily implies in 
equilibrium a negative λ, or a negative shadow value of changes in 
consumers’ social responsibility for the PMP.  
 
To demonstrate this proposition we show that λ needs to be negative 
when the PMP’s market share is nonzero in the steady state. 
Consider a different system in which we look at market shares 


















=       (10) 
Since PB is assumed exogenous and constant, PMP’s market share 
varies in time only for changes in the PMP price (PA) and in 
consumers’ ethical perception (f). 
To find PA‘ we differentiate (9) with respect to time and replace 
































λ θ ρ        (11). 
This equation clearly shows that an increase in prices leads to 
further positive changes of the optimal price in time if the 
combined effect on profits (increased margin on a reduced market 
share) in the second addend dominates the (expected negative) 
effect generated by the marginal cost in terms of PMP profits of a   16
change in social responsibility of consumers. By replacing λ from 
(9) we get: 
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   (12) 




dPA , also  0 =
dt
dz
, the steady state of the 
(z,f) system corresponds to the steady state of the (PA,f) system. 
In steady-state, for f ≠0 ,z’=0 implies that: 
() ( ) 0 2 2 ) 1 ( 2
2 = − − + − − − sw w P f z z
A θ ρ θ       (13) 
We obtain steady state values of the market share and of consumers 
ethical perception by solving the two equation system made by (13) 
and  z f = − ) 1 ( θ  (14), which is the stationary counterpart of the law 
of motion in (5). By replacing this last expression in (13), and 
ruling out negative values of z, we get the following equilibrium 























1 2 * θ ρ         (15) 
Note that this expression establishes that, for having a nonzero 
market, share the PMP must fix a price below his static optimal 
price (the first part of the expression under square brackets). 
This result also tells us that the shadow value of λ is negative, 
as expected, since the PMP must increase his price competition if   17
he want to avoid a path of increasing social responsibility which 
will lead to further reduction of his market share in the future.g 
 
 
3.1.2 Equilibrium and dynamics around the steady state when PMP 
and FT locations are fixed  
 
Solving for the steady state values of PA and f  in the two 
differential equation system of (11’) and (2) we get:  
[] ()
) 3 2 (
3 2 1 ) ( ) 2 ( ) 2 (
2
1 θ ρ θ
θ ρ ρ θ θ θ ρ θ ρ
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θ
+ + + −
<  . This implies that, for w=1, the loss of 
ethical memory must be below around 2/5 for reasonable parameters 
ranges of the discount rate
19 otherwise the model is not 
informative about the likely equilibria.  
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w s
w PA  (17.1) 
and 
 
                                                 
19 Actually θ  is 0.42 with ρ=.85 and 0.436 with ρ=.95. With these values we find that  
PA* always respects the condition w<PA*<w+1/2 implied by the zero profit condition 
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w s
w PA   (17.2) 
 
 
If we analyse properties of the steady state and dynamics around 
equilibrium we find two equilibria, the first is an unstable node 
and is obtained at lower levels of consumers social responsibility 
and PMP price. The second is a saddlepath and is obtained at a 
higher consumers social responsibility and  PMP price. A detailed 
analysis of properties and implications of this multiple 
equilibria solution is provided in Appendix 1. 
 
3.2 The continuous time model when the PMP chooses prices and 
ethical location and FT’s ethical location is exogenously fixed 
 
In this version of the model the PMP maximizes the following 
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under the nonnegative location constraint a≥0. Consider also that: 
i) to rule out positive values generated by the product of 
negative margins and negative market shares we only look at 
























A B A B 1 ' ' θ  19
price cannot be higher than the FT price for real and positive 
values of PMP's market shares. 
Note that (19) is slightly different from the law of motion (2) of 
the previous section, as it incorporates that also the PMP may 
contribute to reinforce the habit of ethically responsible 
consumption in proportion to its market share weighted by its 
degree of imitation of the FT. 
We may start looking at this problem as an unconstrained 
maximization problem searching for interior solutions. Therefore 
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(20) 
where λ=µe
ρt and µ is the costate variable associated to f(t). 
Conditions for an optimum include first order conditions with 
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A B A B 1 ' θ        (23), 
a differential equation for the costate variable including the 
derivative of the Hamiltonian with respect to the state variable 
() ) 1 ( '
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plus initial conditions and the transversality condition 
0 ) 0 ( f f =  
0 ) ( ) ( lim =
∞ → t f t
t µ . 
 
Under  the usual assumption of s exogenously set equal to one, 
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We may then rewrite (21’) as: 
) 1 ( ) 1 ( as w P af P P a A A B + + − + − = − λ  
and, by replacing in (22’), we get  
[] [ ] [ ]0 < → + − = + − − − a w f af w f P P A B λ λ    
This solution is beyond constraints of PMP’s ethical location. 
Therefore there are no internal maxima for this problem. We then 
look at solutions on the constraints and in particular where the 
PMP finds it optimal to undercut PB price and  PA*=PB-ε (which we 
will further demonstrate to be the optimal corner solution). 
Therefore we have to solve  
[] dt a
f
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(26) 
Solving the Hamiltonian for first order condition on (a) we get: 



























c       (27) 
For ε→0 the expression reduces to: 
0 1 2 2 = + + − − λ λ a a        (28) 
and therefore we obtain 
2
1
* = a . 
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1 ' + − + − = f f θ          (29). 
By imposing f’=0 we find the steady state level of consumers’ 
social responsibility  (PA* and a* are always steady state levels 




* = f   with f* being lower, the higher the consumers’ loss 
of ethical memory. 
We must check whether this is the maximum profit solution by 
comparing it with those on the other sides of the “constraint 
square” whose corners in the [a,PA] space are (0,PB-ε; 0,w+k; 1,PB-
ε; 1,w+k). Intuitively it is impossible that  PA=w+k (with k small 
enough) because the  corresponding profit would be low and we are 
in the point of the minimum possible price for the PMP.    22
The only alternative is the solution in which ethical location is 
constrained at a=0, and the price is optimally set by the PMP (we 
therefore fall in the first section model in which PMP ethical 
location was fixed.).  
Optimal profit under a=0 may be calculated by replacing in the PMP 































=       (30) 
while we can easily check that, under a*=1/2 and PA=PB-ε, profit 
tends to sw/4 for ε small enough. 
Therefore the PMP will choose ethical imitation (PA*=PB-ε, a*=1/2) 
only if the following condition holds: 
4 4











This result shows that,  with respect to the static case (λ=0), the 
PMP is much less reluctant to choose ethical imitation. Consider 
in fact that, in the equilibrium with PMP ethical imitation 
(a*=1/2), the PMP market share is around .5 and significantly 
higher than in the stable equilibrium of the model with fixed 
ethical locations (between 0.3 and .05). This result confirms that 
ethical imitation from a PMP is necessary to defend market shares 
after the entry of a zero profit socially concerned producer.   
With more ethical imitation, and with a higher market share, the 
PMP will reduce accumulation of social responsibility in the   23
future since his contribution to the formation of social 
responsibility is much lower than that of the FT. The difference 
between the static and the dynamic case will depend on the PMP 




3.3 The dynamic equilibrium with endogenous PMP and FT location 
 
We must jointly solve in this case two intertemporal maximisation 
problems in which the FT maximises transfers by choosing ethical 
location and the PMP maximises profits by choosing prices and 
ethical location. The FT maximises
20  
  dt a
f
P P




















ρ        (31) 
under the law of motion of consumer’s social responsibility 


















ρ       (32) 
subject to  ) 1 ( as w P
A + ≥ ,   0 ≥ a  and  ε − ≤
B A P P  under the same law of 
motion of consumer’s social responsibility expressed by (19). 
We can solve the problem of the FT by writing the following 
current value Hamiltonian  
                                                 
20  We also assume here that the FT is not completely altruistic 
since he maximises his own transfers and not total transfers to 
the South. This assumption is closer to the actual behaviour of 
FTs. Results from the model with an altruistic FT are omitted for 
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c 1 1 θ  (33) 
where m=ηe
ρt, with η being the costate variable. 
The first order condition with respect to the control variable is: 
0
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A B A B 1 ' θ       (35), 
the differential equation for the costate variable including the 






























A B A B A B θ ρ     (36), 
and the transversality condition 
0 ) ( ) ( lim =
∞ → t f t m
t          (37) 
By looking now at the PMP, we consider that, when f>sw-λ
2, the 
solution of his intertemporal maximisation is the same as in 
section 3.2  with the difference of s≠1.
21 We therefore obtain 
ε − = B A P P *           (38) 
0 2 ) 1 ( = + − − + − λ λ a a sw a
        (39) 
                                                 
21 By inspecting solutions provided at the end of this section we 
will see ex post that the FT will always contribute with its 
location choice to the respect of this inequality since s*(f*) is 
always lower than f* in equilibrium (see Table 2). Therefore FT 
location will never cause PMP departure from ethical imitation.     25
We add to it, from the PMP intertemporal maximization problem, the 
differential equation for the costate variable including the 
derivative of the Hamiltonian with respect to the state variable   
() ) 1 ( '

































− + = λ θ ρ λ  (40) 
and the law of motion of consumers’ perception of social 
responsibility as derived in (22). By considering the system of 



















=       (41) 
 
2 1 ' a a f f + − + − = θ
         (42) 
m m ) ( ' θ ρ + =         (43) 
 
ε − = B A P P *           (44) 
 
0 2 ) 1 ( = + − − + − λ λ a a sw a        (45) 
 
λ θ ρ λ ) ( ' + =           (46) 
 
By replacing (44) in (41), for ε small enough, we get the optimal 
FT’s location 
 
) 1 )( ( * a m f s − − =                        (47) 
  
  
In this equation FT’s optimal location is increasing in consumers’ 
social responsibility and decreasing in the FT’s shadow value of 
changes in consumers’ social responsibility (m). The rationale of 
this apparently counterintuitive result is that, if the shadow 
value is higher, it is more important for the FT to generate 
positive changes in social responsibility which are positively 
related to positive changes of his market share. To increase his   26
market share he has to adopt a less ethical stance to conquer more 
consumers located at his left.  












         (48) 
 
PMP’s optimal location is increasing in consumers’ social 
responsibility and decreasing in the PMP’s shadow value (or 
increasing in the PMP’s shadow cost) of consumers’ social 
responsibility. This is because more ethical imitation would 
reduce FT’s market share and reduce overall current social 
responsibility thereby giving a lower impulse to the  law of 
motion of social responsibility. 
The steady state equilibrium implies the following four conditions  
i)s’=0, ii)f’=0, iii)Pa’=0, iv)a’=0 
By differentiating (47) with respect to time we obtain  
0 ) ( ' ) 1 ( ' ) 1 ( ' ' = − − − − − = m f a a m a f s          (49) 
and, by replacing ii) and iv) we get  
0 ) 1 ( ' ' = − − = a m s             (50) 
By differentiating (51) with respect to time and simplifying we 
get 
 
0 ) 1 ( ' ) 1 ( ' ' = − + − = λ λ s s a          (51) 
and for s’=0 it becomes: 
 
0 ) 1 ( ' ' = − = s a λ           (51’) 
 
The reduced differential equation system is made by (50-51’ and 
42)   27
By inspecting (51’) we find two possible steady-state equilibria. 
The first, with s*=1 and λ’ ≠0, coincides with the equilibrium of 
the previous section (endogenous price and PMP ethical location, 
fixed FT ethical location). The second, with  s*≠1 and 
0 ) ( ' = + = λ θ ρ λ , implies λ=0 








*      (45’), which implies a*≠1.  
Consider also that, for a*≠1, s’=0 if and only if m=0. Hence, if λ 
=0, it follows that also m=0, or, if the costate variable is zero 
for the PMP, it is zero also for the FT.  
We therefore end up with a three equation system in three unknowns 
represented by PMP and FT ethical location and by consumers’ 
social responsibility: 
 
) 1 ( * a f s − =            (52.1) 
2 1 ' a a f f + − + − = θ           (52.2) 
 







*            (52.4) 
 
 
From this system we find that none of the three steady state 
values depends from the intertemporal discount rate. We also find 
that the PMP’s chooses minimum price differentiation.
22 
The reaction function of the FT’s optimal location implies that 
the FT gets nearer to the PMP, the more he opts for ethical   28
imitation.  Again, the interpretation is that market shares are 
more important in the dynamic than in the static model given that 
they crucially affect future consumers’ social responsibility 
through the law of motion of f.  
 
By replacing (52.1) and (52.2) for f’=0 in (45) we find the 
expression for the steady state of PMP’s ethical location as a 
function of the only exogenous parameter: 
0 1 ) 3 ( 4 3 2 3 4 = + + − + − a a a a θ  
This expression is a complex polynomial. We therefore calculate 
numerically the steady state of a * and of the other unknowns in 
the range of feasible values for the ethical loss of memory 
parameter. 
Results presented in table 2 show that, as far as ethical loss of 
memory gets higher, the FT reduces his ethical location and the 
PMP  his ethical imitation at optimum. As a consequence, the 
steady state level of consumers’ ethical perception (and social 
responsibility habit creation) is lower. For high levels of 
ethical loss of memory, we obtain the nearest distance between the 
two locations. An obvious result is that, when both players are 
free to locate, a virtuous circle of increasing social 
responsibility leads to increased social responsibility of 
producers for given levels of loss of memory with respect to the 
                                                                                                                                                                  
22 This result is crucially determined by the assumption that the 
two players share a common rate of intertemporal preference.    29
model presented in section 3.1 where locations were fixed.
23 
Consider also that the PMP market share varies between .5 to .7 in 
a range which is superior to that of the model with fixed ethical 
location.   
 
Table 2 Steady state values of PMP and FT ethical location and PMP 
price. 
Values of the 
loss of 
ethical 



















.1 .71  2.35  7.2 
.15 .65 1.82  5.14 
.2 .59  1.55  3.79 
.25 .56 1.66  3.78 
.3 .54  1.15  2.50 
.35 .52 1.02  3.14 
.40 .49 0.96  1.87 
 
With regard to the stability of this equilibrium consider that, 
from a*=s/(1+s), we know that the PMP chooses location and PA=PB-ε 
independently from f. As a consequence, PMP and FT market shares 
do not vary when f changes. Therefore, also f does not vary since 
variables affecting its law of motion are fixed. This explains why 
PMP and FT shadow values are zero in equilibrium, and implies 
that, whenever consumers social responsibility is such that f>sw-
λ
2/sw




                                                 
23 This reasoning obviously applies until PB hits its upper 
boundary determined by the common consumers reservation price.    30
4. Conclusions 
 
The model gives tangible predictions on competition between zero 
profit socially responsible producers and traditional profit 
maximizing producers. It shows that the PMP reacts in prices and 
ethical location to the entry of an socially concerned producer. 
If consumers social responsibility is below a given threshold, he 
limits himself to price competition, offering his products at a 
discount with respect to the “socially responsible” product (the 
discount varies according to the PMP rate of intertemporal 
preference and to the depreciation rate in the formation of 
consumers’ socially responsible habit). 
If consumers responsibility is above such threshold, he is forced 
to a corner solution to avoid excessive loss of market share. In 
that case, if a constraint on “negative social transfers exists,  
he prefers to partially imitate the social responsible producer by 
choosing minimum price differentiation and about one half of the 
socially responsible producer’s social transfer. 
The paper also shows that the present value of the PMP shadow cost 
of changes in consumers social responsibility crucially determines 
differences in equilibria between the static and the dynamic game: 
i) it enhances PMP’s price competition in the dynamic with respect 
to the static game, ii) it lowers the threshold of consumers 
social responsibility which triggers the PMP’s ethical imitation.  
The rationale for these differences between the static and the 
dynamic analysis is that costs of loosing market shares today are   31
lower in a static than in an intertemporal perspective, since in 
the latter they enhance formation of socially responsible 
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Appendix  
 
Steady state properties of the equilibrium when the PMP location 
is fixed 
 
To analyse properties of the steady state equilibrium in section 
3.1.2 we must consider that the two differential equation  system, 
formed by  (11’) and (2), is highly nonlinear. 
Under the condition of  Pa’=0 , (11') may be rewritten as: 
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b x a           (A.1’) 
where: 
  ; θ ρ + = a   ; 2 sw w b + =   ; B P c =   A P x = and y=f 


















=            (A.2) 
The intersections of this function with the two axes are as 
follows  
 
A1(0,  ab c/ ) ;  A2(c,0) 
 
Consider that we are only interested to solutions for which b/2>x, 
since this condition is equivalent to the condition that the PMP 
price (PA*) must be lower than the optimal static price or, in 
other terms, that  λ<0. Remember that this condition is always   34
respected, since it is also the condition for a nonzero market 
share for the PMP. 
To identify the shape of this locus in the [y,x] space consider 
that 
b c x if
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But this last inequality corresponds exactly to  0 ) 1 ( > + + − d g w PA . 
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the Pa’=0  locus is convex  in the feasible set b/2>x, and, given 
that the set of the real numbers is constrained to b/2>x, we are 
interested only to the area in which the locus is convex. 









f A B θ  
 
By totally differentiating this expression we find that: 
 




which implies that (A.3) decreases for  f<1/2θ and increases when 
the inequality is reversed. Hence, when consumers social 
responsibility is  high, an increase in the PMP price is 
consistent with higher steady state levels of consumers social 
1 2
1
0 ) 2 1 (
−







responsibility in equilibrium. This occurs because of the increase 
of FT share after PMP price rise.  
On the contrary, for lower levels of consumers social 
responsibility, the opposite occurs and the steady state in the 
law of motion of consumers social responsibility is such that 
higher PMP prices imply lower levels of consumers social 
responsibility. This occurs because, for low levels of consumers 
social responsibility, the negative effect of the loss of ethical 
memory is higher than the positive impact of the increase of FT 
share after PMP price rise.  
To identify the position of the two steady state loci in the [PA,f] 


























A . The sign 
of the first derivative implies that, as far as the PMP raises his 
price, his market share tends to shrink and consumers’ social 
responsibility gets higher. The sign of the second derivative 
implies that, when consumers’ social responsibility is higher, the 
PMP reduces his price not to loose too much market share.  
We then have two equilibria, the first is an unstable node and is 
obtained at lower levels of consumers social responsibility and 
PMP price. The second is a saddlepath and is obtained at a higher 
consumers social responsibility and  PMP price. 
Figure 1 illustrates the phase diagram in which the two curves 
intersect each other in two points which correspond to the two 
equilibria E1=(f1*, PA1*) and E2=(f2*, PA2*).   36
Around the first equilibrium social responsibility is so low that 
the depreciation effect dominates. Going rightward and below the 
equilibrium point, we may collapse to a point in which social 
responsibility goes to zero and the PMP price is moderately low. 
Going leftward and above this unstable node, the rise of social 
responsibility and/or PMP price leads to the area of the second 
equilibrium and to his saddlepath. Along this saddlepath we 
converge to the second equilibrium in which PMP prices are 
moderately low and consumers social responsibility is above one 
(the leftward monetary distance between the transfer considered 
fair by a given consumer and the effective transfer has more than 
proportional effects on consumers preferences). In this 
equilibrium f is above one for reasonable parameters ranges of ρ 
and θ (and tends to be much larger, the lower the loss of ethical 
memory) and the PMP sells his product at a discount between .5 and 
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Figure 1. Dynamics around the two equilibria when PMP and FT 
locations are fixed 
 
 
       38
 Table 1.a Steady state values of  PMP price (PA) for different 
levels of discount rate (ρ) and loss of ethical memory (θ) when FT 
and PMP locations are fixed (PMP price is calculated as a percent 
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Table 1.b Steady state values of  consumers social responsibility 
for different levels of discount rate (ρ) and loss of ethical 
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Table 1.c Steady state values of  PMP’s price for different levels 
of discount rate (ρ) and loss of ethical memory (θ) when FT and PMP 
locations are fixed (PMP price is calculated as a percent discount 
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 Table 1.d Steady state values of  consumers social responsibility 
for different levels of discount rate (ρ) and loss of ethical 
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Tables 1.a-1.d present results of simulations of the values of PA* 
(expressed as a percent discount on the FT’s price PB) and f under 
reasonable parameter ranges for θ and ρ under the two different 
equilibria. An apparently paradoxical result is the positive 
relationship between PA and consumers loss of ethical memory in the 
first equilibrium (the unstable node) (Table 1.a) against the 
negative relationship in the second equilibrium (the saddlepath) 
(Table 1.c). The rationale is that, in the second equilibrium, the 
sensitivity of the equilibrium consumer’s social responsibility to 
the consumers loss of memory is very high (reduced loss of memory 
leads to very high steady state levels of social responsibility). 
This implies that, at very high levels of social responsibility, 
the amount of loss of ethical memory  is equivalent to additional 
current contributions to social responsibility from the fact that 
the FT controls large part of the market. We are therefore near to 
a saturation point in which social responsibility cannot go 
further and therefore the PMP may at margin increase a little his 
prices in equilibrium.
24 
This does not occur for lower levels of social responsibility in 
the steady state. In those cases we are far from the saturation of 
consumers habit and the PMP must keep prices lower for lower 
levels of consumers' loss of memory, if he want to keep the system 
in equilibrium. 
                                                 
24 Consider for instance that, in the saddlepath equilibrium, when 
the PMP price is around .8 of the FT price and f is around 10, we 
have a tiny PMP’s market share of approximately .02. Nonetheless, 
f is in equilibrium since the loss of ethical memory leads to a   43
Consider also that, if we compute market shares under the two 
equilibria, we find that, while under the first (unstable node) 
the PMP market share is between .9 and .5 according to different 
levels of  loss of ethical memory, it drops to a range between 0.3 
to 0.05 in the saddlepath equilibrium. For low levels of loss of 
ethical memory the PMP producer risks to loose much of his market 
share. This is one of the reasons justifying the analysis in 
section 3.2 where we look for model equilibria when the PMP 






                                                                                                                                                                  
depreciation of f slightly less than 1, with a contribution from 
current FT’s market share of the same amount.  